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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
(3 1 " • I HE 
ST ATI " IDF UTAH 
STATU ni< 111 Ml 
/ Vi Untiff-Respondcnt, 
vs. 
JAMi^S E. TRAVIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPO^OFvr 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 0¥ THE CASE 
The appellant, James E. Travis, appeals from a con-
viction of 'the crime of robbei} entered against him in 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE I X)WER CO! JRT 
i lie appellant "was found guilty t yf r *bb< r\ by a jury 
and was sentenced to eetrve in the I :«ii- SI.-N !>rison 
for the indeterminate teams of 1-15 vev> 
Case No, 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of 
Facts with the following additions and corrections: 
1. The evidence offered by the State also showed 
that: 
a. Appellant kicked one of the victims and said, 
"Don't move and don't stick your heads up because we 
have a gun and we'll blow your heads off" (Tr. 108, 130, 
2nd day); 
b. Mr. LaVoy, a bystander who witnessed the crime, 
testified that two people got out of a blue 1962 Impala 
with green license plates and white lettering, walked side 
by side to the lounge, exited carrying a money bag, and 
drove quickly away (Tr. 142, 143, 1st day); 
d. Appellant and Mr. Kendricks did not have a 
verbal or physical exchange between them (Tr. 117-121, 
1st day; 107-108, 2nd day). 
2. On cross-examination appellant admitted (a) 
that the codefendant's reasons for returning to the bar 
did not make any sense (Tr. 242, 2nd day); (b) that 
he did not know when the appellant took the wallets and 
money of the victims (Tr. 248, 2nd day); (c) that the 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
money bag containing the currency was ripped open and 
discarded from the car in which appellant was riding be-
fore appellant apparently knew a robbery had been, com-
mitted (Tr. 253, 2nd day; 287, 3rd day), 
-i. In denying defense counsel's motion to call appel-
lant's codefendanit as a witness, the court relied on the 
case of State v, Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P. 2d 
689, cert, denied, 368 U. S. 922, 82 S. Ot. 246, 7 L. Ed. 
2d 137 (1960), and that such opportunity was unethical 
because the only effect that the tesitimony could have 
had upon the jury was to show that appellant's codefem-
cl ; lit was the perpetrator of the crime (Tr, 210, 2nd day; 
278-277, 3rd day). . 
4. In denying defense counsel's motion to introduce 
an affidavit of appellant's oodefendant the court rejected, 
appellant's argument that Rule 43IIM >>f the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Rules 63(2) and WHO) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence allowed Ui<* in i reduction of such 
an affidavit in a criminal proMrh:- -
ARGUMK.VI 
FOIM ' 
T H E T R ] [ A L C 0 U R T F 0 L L 0 W E D rj^ 
PROPER PROCEDURE BY DENYING AP-
PELLANT THE RIGHT TO CALL HIS CO-
DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS WHEN THE 
CODEFENDANT INVOKED HIS PRIVI-
LEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
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Appellant was convicted of robbery under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, which provides: 
"(1) Robbery is the unlawful and inten-
tional taking of personal property in the posses-
sion of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, accomplished by 
means of iawe or fear. 
U (2) Robbery is a felony of the second de-
gree." 
The fact that the basic elements of the crime of 
robbery were committed is not disputed by appellant. 
Appellant's contention is that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by refusing to allow the appellant to 
call his codefendant as a witness when the codefendant 
testified that he would invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination. Respondent contends that (1) the ad-
missibility of the codefendant's testimony lies within 
the discretion of the trial court; (2) the voir dire exam-
ination of the witness out of the piresence of the jury to 
determine whether the witness intended to invoke his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against sdf-incrimination 
was the proper procedure in deciding whether to prohibit 
the witness from being called to testify; and (3) the 
practicality of this position is substantiated by the great 
weight of policy considerations. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) pro-
vides: 
"Except as in these rules otherwise pro-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vided, the judge may in his discretion exclude 
evidence if he finds that its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will (a) necessitate undue consump-
tion of time or (b) create substantial dangers 
of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or 
of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and 
harmfully surprise a party who has not had 
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such 
evidence would be offered." 
As the note following this rule points out, the power of 
the trial court to exclude certain evidence is necessary 
for the orderly and efficient trial procedure. Rule 45^  
U. R, E. (1971). In the present case the trial count 
found that the admission of the codefendant's testimony 
would create substantial danger of undue prejudice in 
his later trial. In addition, the codef endant testified dur-
ing voir dire examination that he intended to invoke his 
privilege against self-inoriminatiion if he were called to 
the stand and questioned about this incident (Tr. 208-
209, 2nd day). Therefore!, the trial court was justified 
in finding that the attempt to examine the codefendant 
would necessitate an undue consumption of time as well 
as create undue prejudice for the codefendant in his 
later severed trial. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution declares in part that "No person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486-
487, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818, 75 L. Ed. 1118, 1124 (1951), the 
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Supreme Court enunciated the standard for measuring 
when a witness may properly claim his right againsit 
self ^ crimination and thus refuse to respond to ques-
tioning: 
"To sustain the privilege, it need only be 
evident from the implications of the question, 
in the setting in which it was asked, that a re-
sponsive answer to the question or an explana-
tion of why it cannot be answered might be 
dangerous because injurious disclosure could re-
sult." 
In that case the Court held that the witness could in-
voke his privilege against self-incrimination where the 
answers to certain questions could have linked him with 
a federal crime. 
The Hoffman Court also indicated, however,, that 
a simple blanket declaration by the witness that he could 
not testify for fear of self-incrimination without a de-
termination of its sufficiency, would not suffice to invoke 
the privilege. 341 U. S. at 486. Accordingly, the custom 
is for the trial judge to examine the protesting witness 
out of the presence of the jury in order to determine 
the validity of his claim. Once the court satisfies itself 
that the claim is well-grounded as to the testimony de-
sired, it may, in its discretion, decline to permit either 
party to place the witness on the stand for the purpose 
of eliciting a claim of privilege or to comment on this 
circumstance. United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F. 2d 
1213 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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In United States v. Lacouture, 495 F. 2d 1237, reh. 
denied, 495 F. 2d 1241 (5rtih Cir. 1974), where the witness 
after extensive examination before the court in cham-
bers, advised the court that on her attorney's advice 
she would invoke the Fifth Amendment, the court held 
that if it appeared a witness intended to claim the privi-
lege as to essentially all questions, the court could, in 
its discretion, refuse to allow the witness to take the 
stand. In Commonwealth v. Roukas, Mass. App., 313 
N. E. 2d 143 (1974), where a witness was excused fol-
lowing a voir dire examination in which he declined to 
answer questions on the ground that his answers might 
tend to incriminate him, the court held that the trial 
court's decision to hold a voir dire examination was a 
proper exercise of sound judicial discretion. These de-
cisions hold that the voir dire examination of the witness 
was not only within the discretion of the trial court but 
that it was sound judicial discretion to follow such a 
procedure. Indeed, in Gomez-Rojas, supra, the most re-
cent decision dealing with this issue, where the witness 
informed the trial judge that he could not testify for 
fear of self-incrimination, and the judge without a hear-
ing, accepted the witness' claim, the court held that the 
trial judge erred in that he did not hold a hearing to 
determine whether the witness' fears of self-incrimina-
tion were well founded. 
A case very much resembling the facts of the pres-
ent case is State v. Toliver, 5 Wash. App. 321, 487 P. 
2d 264 (1971), where an attorney representing the ap-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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pellent's burglary accomplice objected to the introduc-
tion of the accomplice's testimony on the ground that 
there was danger of self-incrimination, which privilege 
the witness subsequently asserted in his own behalf. 
The court held that if the question prima facie appeared 
to be incriminatory, the witness was the sole judge of 
whether the answer in fact inmminated him, and thus 
the witness' objection was upheld. The court relied 
heavily on the trial court's knowledge that the accomplice 
was awaiting trial out of charges arising from the same 
burglaries with which the appellant was charged. Id. at 
269. Similarly, in State v. Bell, 112 N. H. 444, 298 A. 2d 
753 (1972), where a juvenile witness testified in cham-
bers that he intended to follow defense counsel's advice 
and claim the privilege against self-incrimiination when-
ever "they asked anything about me," the court held 
that, after carefully questioning a witness^ if it appeared 
that ther was no relevant nonprivileged testimony which 
the witness could have offered, there was no error in ex-
cusing the witness from further testifying. The present 
case clearly falls within the standard of Toliver, supra, 
and the trial court recognized that pending charges 
against appellant's codefendant created a prima facie 
case of incrimination. Nevertheless, the trial court asked 
the codefendant whether he would claim the Fifth 
Amendment if questioned at all about the incident, to 
which the codefendant answered that he would (Tr. 
208-209, 2nd day). In Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 
508, 313 A. 2d 847 (1974), where appellant's witness 
agreed with his attorney in the judge's chambers that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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he would refuse to give testimony concerning a certain 
day's activities on the ground that it might tend to in-
criminate him and during voir dire examination of the 
witness outside of the presence of the jury the witness 
reiterated his firm resolve to invoke the privilege as to 
all questions concerning activities of that day, the trial 
judge even informed the jury that the witness had been 
called by the defendant and invoked his privilege against 
self4ncriminatijon, which did not occur in the present 
case, and the court still held there was nothing improper 
in the actions of the trial court. 
A common argument against the procedure of the 
trial court concerns the reliability of the inferences that 
can be drawn from a witness who invokes the privilege 
againsit self-incrimination. In Lacouture, supra, the court 
rejects this argument since the inferences that can be 
found in favor of the prosecution and the defense are 
equal. 495 F. 2d at 1240. In State v. Miller, 6 Or. App. 
366, 487 P. 2d 1387 (1971), where appellant's codefen-
dant in a murder trial claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination out of the presence of the jury, and made 
it clear he would continue to do so, the court held that 
it was not improper for the trial court to refuse to re-
quire the codefendant to testify even if he would have 
only claimed his privilege against self -incrimination. The 
court rejected the argument that speculation in the minds 
of the jurors would be caused when the codefendant did 
not testify because if the codefendant had taken the wit-
ness stand he would have claimed the privilege and the 
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jury could have been left in a state of speculation any-
way. Id. at 1390. 
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in 
not investigating the valid scope of the codefendant's 
privilege. As discussed above, many courts recognize that 
such a detailed investigation is unnecessary in a situation 
like the present case where a codefendant invokes the 
privilege as to all questions in order to protect his own 
later severed trial. In United States v. Wilcox, 450 F. 
2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1971), where the district judge knew 
of the witness' testimony at a previous trial and was 
aware that counsel had advised the witness that there 
were other offenses for which he could be prosecuted, 
the court held that the district judge was not required 
to conduct a factually detailed inquiry before permitting 
the witness to invoke his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The court noted that in effect the judge would be 
asking whether the witness had lied in the first trial, 
an affirmative answer to which would have formed a link 
in the chain of possible future prosecutions. Id. at 1140. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED THE 
PROPER PROCEDURE BY DENYING AP-
PELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRO-
DUCE INTO EVIDENCE THE CODEFEN-
DANT'S PRIOR AFFIDAVIT. 
In denying defense counsel's motion to introduce an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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affidavit of appellant's codefendant, made during the 
course of testimony on the motion to sever, the court 
rejected the appellant's argument that Rule 43(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953), and Rule 
63(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), which allow 
an affidavit to be admitted in civil proceedings as an 
exception to the hearsay rule, also allowed the introduc-
tion of such an affidavit in this criminal prosecution (Tr. 
278-279, 3rd day). The note following the rule states 
that the reason for the affidavit exception is to provide 
substantial compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
In addition the prior statement made by appellant's 
codefendant was given with the assurance that the state-
ment would not be used in violation of the codefendant's 
privilege against self-incidmination. The following dia-
logue occurred between the trial judge and the attorney 
for the codefendant during the course of the motion to 
sever when the judge requested that the codefendant 
testify under oath: 
"MR. HOUSELY: Your Honor, first of all, it 
is my understanding it would not be a waiver 
of the right not to take the stand? 
THE COURT: Certainly not. This isn't part 
of the trial. 
MR. HOUSELY: It wouldn't be a waiver of 
the right to give evidence against himself if he 
is called as a witness in a subsequent bearing? 
For example, if my witness were called against 
Travis in a subsequent proceeding, then he 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
would still retain his right against self-incrimina-
tdon? 
THE COURT: Yes. We will run the trial ac-
cording to the Constitution. It guarantees 
that." (Tr. 334). 
On the basis that the testimony would not be used 
in violation of has privilege against self-incrimination, the 
codefendant consented to testify. At the time of appel-
lant's trials the trial judge recognized that the codefen-
dant's testimony could have had an incriminating effect 
upon his own separate trial and therefore, in accordance 
with the standard procedure followed by the great weight 
of authorities discussed above, properly dismissed the 
codefendant from testifying. It seems senseless indeed 
to sustain the codefendant's privilege against self-incrim-
ination and then admit the same evidence by way of 
affidavit, particularly when the testimony was given on 
the premise that it would not be used in violation of the 
codefendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. In accordance 
with this reasoning, the cases cited by the appellant are 
distinguishable from the present case since the prior 
testimony in those cases was given at a prior trial or 
preliminary hearing, and not during a motion to sever 
where the trial judge and counsel agreed that such testi-
mony would not constitute a waiver of the codefendant's 
Fifth Amendment rights. 
Respondent contends that in order for the affidavit 
to have been admitted into evidence, if it could have 
been admitted into evidence, in a criminal proceeding, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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it was necessary for appellant to prove that the codefen-
dant did not properly invoke his privilege during the 
motion to sever or during the trial of the appellant. Dur-
ing the testimony taken during the motion to sever, al-
though not under trial circumstances, appellant made 
no objection to the judge's decision that the testimony 
would not be produced in a later proceeding against the 
codefendant's privilege. Moreover, the appellant's objec-
tion to the procedure of the court during the trial has 
been shown to lack merit, in accordance with the custom 
and standard of the majority of courts under Pbint I 
above. 
Appellant also contends that the testimony is admis-
sible under Rule 63(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), as a declaration against interest. Respondent 
contends that this Rule is "subject to the limitations of 
Rule 63(6)" of the Rules of Evidence (1971), which 
provides that such previous statement is admissible "if, 
and only if, . . . the circumstances under which the 
statement was made were not violative of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused." Clearly, in accordance with 
the agreement during the motion to sever and in accord-
ance with the determinations made by the trial judge 
at the time of trial, introduction of the codefendant's 
prior testimony was violative of his constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. 
Nevertheless, if the court finds that the procedure 
followed by the trial court, in not allowing the codefen-
dant or his testimony to be presented before the jury, 
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was error, was the error harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In State v. Bell, supra, where the court found no 
error in the procedure of the trial court, the court held 
that even if the procedure had been improper, it was 
harmless error since prejudice to the defendant must be 
established in order to constitute reversible error. 298 
A. 2d at 757. There was no prejudice to the appellant 
in the present case since the testimony of the codefen-
dant during the motion to sever was of no significance 
and the evidence presented by the prosecution during 
the trial proved that a robbery was committed and ap-
pellant was one of the persons who committed the crime. 
The codefendant's testimony during the motion to 
sever established that (a) appellant did not come into 
the bar until fighting had commenced between the co-
defendant and the bartender; (b) the appellant did not 
discuss the money bags with the codefendant; and (c) 
the appellant was hit by the codefendant (Tr. 338-339). 
In addition, the codefendant actually implicated the 
appellant by stating that he, as one of three possibilities, 
could have picked up the green money bag containing 
the money belonging to the bar and a driver's license of 
one of the victims which was later found in the automo-
bile (Tr. 239-240). 
At the trial the evidence presented by the prosecu-
tion showed that: (a) appelant and his codefendant 
entered the lounge together and pushed the victims 
down on the floor (Tr. 116-118, 1st day; 124-125, 2nd 
day); (b) appellant and his codefendant forcibly took the 
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victims' wallets, money, and other personal belongings, 
and then took money belonging to the business located 
in a money bag and cash register behind the bar counter 
(Tr. 119-121, 1st day; 126-129, 2nd day); (c) appellant 
and his codefendant did not have a verbal or physical 
exchange between them (Tr. 117-121, 1st day; 107-106, 
2nd day); (d) two persons left the lounge together car-
rying a money bag (Tr. 143,1st day); (e) Mr. Zancanella 
told the police he had been robbed (Tr. 144, 1st day); 
(f) appellant, his codefendant, and Miss Rewe were* 
later apprehended with various rolls of coins,, sacks, 
and personal items belonging to the victims and the 
lounge (Tr. 174-183, 191-194, 2nd day); (g) at the place 
place of apprehension, Mr. Zancanella identified appel-
lant and his codefendant as the men who had robbed 
him (Tr. 124, 1st day). In addition, a bystander testi-
fied that two people got out of a blue 1962 Impala with 
green license plates and white lettering, went together 
into the lounge, exited carrying a money bag, and drove 
quickly away (Tr. 142-144, 1st day). Furthermore, the 
appellant was apprehended within minutes after the rob-
bery had taken place while in the process of leaving the 
State of Utah (Tr. 155-157, 2nd day). This evidence was 
clearly sufficient, with or without the testimony of ap-
pellant's codefendant for the jury to find that a robbery 
had been committed and appellant was one of the per-
sons who committed the crime. Therefore, the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
CONCLUSION 
Because the procedure of the trial court was proper, 
in allowing appellant's codefendant to invoke his privi-
lege against selfninCTinunation and not allowing the ap-
pellant to introduce a prior affidavit of the codefendant 
in violation of the codefendant's privilege, and any error 
that could have been committed was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, appellant's rights during the trial were 
not prejudiced. Therefore, respondent respectfully sub-
mits that appellant's request for a new trial be denied 
and that the verdict and judgment of the jury at the 
trial be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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